Shaping the Air Force Contribution to National Strategy (1970)

Originally Published in March of 1970

The strategic environment of the past two decades, largely shaped by the national and international security interests of the world’s major powers, has confronted the United States with unprecedented challenges. Meeting the exigencies of the cold war has required major political, economic, and military efforts on our parts.

The strategic environment of the past two decades, largely shaped by the national and international security interests of the world’s major powers, has confronted the United States with unprecedented challenges. Meeting the exigencies of the cold war has required major political, economic, and military efforts on our parts. The grave and continuing threats posed to our national survival have necessitated the establishment of large sophisticated forces-in-being, capable of responding to various challenges. Management of such forces has been a task requiring coordination between political leaders and military decision-makers involved with the management of U.S. strategic postures and capabilities. The Hq USAF Deputate for Plans and Operations plays a central role in the Air Force contribution to national security policies and the development of the postures and capabilities required to support them. This includes efforts on every level, from broad strategic concepts and doctrine to the employment of specific elements of hardware. As a result of World War II and postwar technological progress and because of their size and natural strength, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the two major powers on the world scene. This, together with their strongly contending ideologies, led to a polarization of political and economic interests, reinforced by strategic alliances. Leadership of the Communist world, possession of nuclear weapons, and a formidable array of conventional power in Eastern Europe combined to make the Soviet Union a superpower capable of threatening the survival of Western Europe and the United States in its role as leader of the free world. Unprecedented developments and weapons technology have endowed both the United States and the Soviet Union with military power never before possible. Their mutual assured-destruction capability is so overwhelming that both powers have undertaken to arrive at understandings concerning the limitation and control of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear capabilities which for so long provided a shared monopoly of military power have, paradoxically, allowed other nations greater leverage in the international environment than heretofore possible. Many nations, having regained strength lost in World War II, have begun to assume positions of greater confidence and independence. Britain, France, and Communist China now have nuclear weapons; others possess the requisite technology to develop similar capabilities. While the two superpowers remain strategically predominant, the polarization of other powers around them has thus gradually declined, leading to the emergence of a multipolar environment. The European NATO members are speaking with more independence than before as they seek greater leverage in their own defense and other affairs as well. The term “satellite” no longer reflects the true status of the lesser Communist nations. The Czechoslovakian crisis demonstrates the ferment and potential for crisis that underlie Soviet relations with her Eastern European allies.

The existence of five nuclear powers and the potential for further nuclear proliferation have greatly increased the complexity of international relations. This changing international relationship has required fundamental changes in our thinking and a reshaping of capabilities to ensure military responsiveness to U.S. national security objectives.

United States national security objectives reflect our basic national aims and undertakings, our intentions with respect to possible threats to our national security, our attitudes toward external political and social problems, and our assessment of the international environment in which we operate. In broad terms, our objectives emphasize the search for a world community of free and independent nations, secure from the threat of aggression and respectful of basic human rights and the rule of law.

To support these goals, this nation will require balanced and sophisticated military strategies and weapon systems that are capable of dealing with a wide variety of contingencies. To provide the required range of alternatives, there has to be a constant reassessment and readjustment of our capabilities as well as in our ways of thinking about and dealing with our problems.

An appreciation of the versatility and range of the required capabilities can perhaps best be gained by a brief look at the three basic types of conflict possibilities which the United States must be prepared for, now and in the future.

A superpower is any state that can threaten the survival of all other states; that is, a nation having in effect an assured-destruction capability. Such a conflict between the United States and another superpower currently means war with the Soviet Union, and perhaps at some time in the distant future it could include Communist China as well. Though deliberate initiation of nuclear war between superpowers is unlikely, the consequences of such a war are so grave that we must prepare for it as a matter of first priority. For some time, the term “general war” has been used as the label for such a war, but using that term obscures the different forms such a war might take. While “general war” has come to be equated with massive, deliberate exchanges of thermonuclear weapons, a war between superpowers could take other forms as well, depending on how the war begins, the objectives of the opponents, and their military capabilities. In fact, given the existence of convincing assured-destruction forces, nuclear war is more likely to be approached cautiously from lesser forms of confrontation that have gradually escalated than to erupt in the form of an unexpected sudden onslaught.

Considerations such as these have led to a belief in the need to broaden the basis of deterrence. It is well known that in the past our national strategy for deterring Soviet military action has emphasized the two tasks of assured destruction and damage limitation. Assured destruction (AD) is and will remain the foundation of deterrence; a damage-limiting capability makes our deterrent threat credible. However, the Air Force believes that additional capabilities are required, capabilities beyond those adapted exclusively to the assured-destruction role. A U.S. strategic force structured exclusively to achieve the AD mission could fail to provide the flexibility and range of options which the National Command Authorities might want in order to back up lesser-intensity U.S. actions or to dominate and hence control the escalation possibilities in a particular crisis. Accordingly, this task requires forces which are usable in a discriminating and responsive manner under conditions of utmost control and precision. Such forces would provide an option of controlling escalation and bringing a conflict to an acceptable end. Their objective would be to provide national decision-makers with usable military power (as opposed to deterrent power) in forms that are politically relevant, forms that can be used to influence or coerce an opponent. These are capabilities specifically geared to discrimination and a different order of enemy values from those addressed by our deterrent forces. They would have a capability for communicating both intent to limit war-fighting actions and readiness to negotiate on reasonable terms. The Air Force can make a unique contribution in this respect because the attributes of aerospace power—and this is especially true of manned systems—lend themselves particularly well to the conduct of operations in a highly controlled environment.

wars between the United States and 
lesser powers

The kind of conflict in which we are most likely to be tested is that with other than superpowers. Limited political objectives and the tailoring of military means to those objectives will generally characterize such wars. “Winning” in this type of conflict means achieving the national objectives involved rather than the old simplistic objective of destroying the enemy. It requires not only a convincing military superiority but also closely coordinated efforts between political and military decision-makers. Owing to the dual political and military objective in most conflicts of this type, the exercise of control in the use of military force is a central characteristic. The problem in constructing strategy for such wars is that of developing effective military means, policies, weapons, tactics, and techniques capable of achieving the limited political objectives within the constraints imposed.

In the complex and subtle form of conflict known as insurgency, military measures may be less important than political, economic, psychological, and police measures. Dealing with insurgency through counterinsurgency combat tactics alone can be a very expensive approach. Air power may have its most lasting effect in the civic action, nation-building, and pacification aspects of countering insurgency, although the use of military air power in most of its traditional roles will continue. The intensity of its use would be lower than in the other two categories of warfare, though, and would be conditioned further by an emphasis on indigenous capabilities wherever possible. Airlift, in several operational categories, will be especially important. Among several very real opportunities for the Air Force in the nation-building role will be the development of air lines of communication in lieu of surface routes and assistance to a developing country in the establishment of national command, control, and communications to foster peaceful development.

These, then, are but the barest outlines of the three most basic types of possible conflict. It is only too likely that the changing world environment noted earlier, particularly developments in multipolarity and nuclear proliferation, will compound the possibilities for conflict that could involve the United States.

In the complex new dynamics of the world environment, the national leadership of the United States needs all the more to maintain its capability to respond to rapidly evolving crisis situations so as to achieve desired objectives with the least amount of risk. As a matter of ordinary foresight and preparedness, national decision-makers need to be provided with an array of usable options ranging from diplomatic through psychological and economic actions to the direct application of force as a last resort. If the alternatives in a given situation include the employment of military power, the strategy used must take into account not only all possible alternative options but also unforeseen developments, such as technological or enemy-inspired surprise. It must provide for a mix of different forms and gradations of power to deal effectively with particular conflict situations, while avoiding artificial distinctions between levels of warfare that would lead to the fragmenting of U.S. forces into separate and less efficient elements. Finally, the required military advice and counsel in support of various alternative courses of action must be capable of effective interaction with other instruments of national power and must be responsive to the changing dictates of national policy.

The organizational and procedural framework for meeting such requirements and for projecting military capabilities is embodied in statutory prescription and in military doctrines that have evolved in response to changing environmental circumstances and national security imperatives. The basic operational command structure that has evolved emphasizes the increased centralization of the Department of Defense policy-making machinery. In theory, the services generate the forces and provide required support, while the unified and specified commanders employ them in the operational role. However, service responsibilities do not suddenly terminate when their forces are assigned to one of the unified or specified commands. The total responsibility for generating air forces, putting them in a combat-ready posture, and sustaining that posture belongs to the Air Force. The dual role of the Chief of Staff places the Air Force squarely in the middle of both the operational and the support functions. The central feature of Air Force involvement is the application of aerospace power as engineered by the Air Staff in its interaction with the Joint Staff.

The focal point within the Air Staff where the operational and support chains meet is the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations. The DCS/P&O is unique among the five Deputy Chiefs of Staff in that, aside from performing Air Staff functions in the plans and operations areas, he provides the Air Staff channel to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). He is responsible to the Chief of Staff for providing operationally ready forces to the unified and specified commands, developing operational concepts and doctrines for the employment of weapon systems and forces, and providing advice and response to the Chief of Staff on all Air Force matters considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, he functions as the Chief of Staff’s Operations Deputy, the Chief’s principal assistant for JCS matters. In the latter capacity, he becomes responsible to the Chief of Staff for USAF participation in joint and combined policy-making and planning activities; as such he becomes the focal point for a wide range of JCS issues that are referred to the Air Force for resolution. This organization evolved on the basis of experience gained during the Cuban crisis. The objective was to integrate Air Staff planning with the day-to-day operations of the Air Force, so as to provide a capability for prompt responses to any national emergency.

There are three directorates under the DCS/P&O: Plans; Operations; and Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives.

The Directorate of Plans consists of two deputy directorates—Force Development, and Plans and Policy—plus an Assistant Director for Joint and National Security Council (NSC) matters. The latter is responsible for providing principal support to the Director and the DCS/P&O for the development of Air Staff positions on all JCS and NSC matters.

The Deputy Directorate for Force Development evaluates existing and programmed forces, capabilities, resources, procurement, and development programs and conducts studies to determine the USAF force objectives required to meet the threat and support the strategy. From these evaluations evolves the Air Force portion of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP). This organization also develops the USAF War and Mobilization Plan (WMP), which provides basic guidance for military and industrial readiness planning. Included in the WMP are wartime aircraft activity and munitions planning factors for the computation of War Readiness Material (WRM) requirements. Additionally, the organization develops Air Staff positions on matters related to the Single-Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) and the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and determines nuclear and nonnuclear weapons requirements. An-other important facet of its responsibility is the development and monitorship of the overall USAF mobility and bare-base programs as published in the USAF Mobility Plan.

The Plans and Policy Deputy Directorate monitors, reviews, and develops the Air Staff position on matters pertaining to war planning actions of the unified and specified commands. It maintains liaison with the Department of State; monitors worldwide political developments; participates in politico-military planning, and initiates action to obtain foreign military rights for the Air Force. It also develops Air Staff positions on military assistance and disarmament, nuclear weapons policy, airlift policy, and joint planning, including command and organizational relationships among principal non elements; develops Air Staff positions on counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare objectives, and prisoner of war matters, including escape and evasion.

The Directorate of Operations supervises operational functions with regard to the statutory responsibilities of the Air Force and operations in support of the unified and specified command structure. This directorate is responsible for the staff supervision of all training and equipping of USAF combat and support forces. A close day-by-day monitoring and evaluation of Southeast Asia operations is carried out to ensure maximum success of this effort. There are four deputy directorates within the organizational structure of the directorate.

The Strike Forces Deputy Directorate exercises staff supervision over strategic, tactical, and air defense weapon systems, including crew training and operations, general war and contingency planning for employment of these weapon systems, and requirements and special activities as required by the Director of Operations. Additionally, the Deputy Directorate monitors, supports, and articulates, as appropriate, operational concepts or requirements during study, research, programming, development, and procurement phases of weapon systems and munitions acquisition.

The Strike Support Deputy Directorate provides operational guidance to the strike support forces, develops operational concepts and directives for, and exercises staff supervision over, tactical and strategic airlift, tactical and strategic reconnaissance, electronic warfare support, air rescue, weather, and mapping and geodetic activities. It is also responsible for all major management matters related to the total USAF audio-visual effort and serves as the Air Force focal point for civil disturbance airlift requirements, matters pertaining to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), and operational matters pertaining to Air Force Reserve affairs.

The Operational Test and Evaluation Deputy Directorate is responsible for planning, directing, and evaluating all Air Force operational test and evaluation programs and for providing centralized Air Force management and policy guidance over all non-R&D test programs.

The mission of the USAP Command Post Deputy Directorate, with its worldwide command and control systems, is to minimize the reaction time of the Air Force to any unusual or emergency situation. The communications network of the Command Post allows the Chief of Staff and key Air Staff personnel to convene a telephone conference with all major commanders in less than two minutes. This capability is available as backup for National Military Command Center War Room. As the focal point for contingency and battle staff actions, the Command Post is a storehouse of operational information on all emergency war plans of the major commands. The Command Post operates continuously to monitor the status of forces and operations around the world and to provide current information on the readiness of these forces to execute emergency war plans. Automatic data processing and computer technology are used extensively to provide timely information to the Chief of Staff and the Battle Staff.

The Director of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives has the responsibility for preparing the Air Force for evolutionary change. There is an increasing need to devote effort to the development of the more abstract concept and objectives, which seem deferrable in the stress of day-to-day problems but which alone can lay the groundwork for future Air Force developments. The functioning of this directorate is dependent upon original, creative thinking toward the Air Force of the future and the forward-looking aspects of Air Force strategy in the light of anticipated political and technological change. This means studying world political, economic, and social environments and technological developments as they affect future strategy and force concepts. It includes maintaining liaison between the Air Force and the scientific, academic, and industrial communities.

The USAF Planning Concepts document, prepared and distributed by this directorate, articulates Air Force long-range concepts and desired capabilities and serves as a base from which the Air Force can align its efforts toward its long-term objectives. In close harmony with its long-range planning efforts, this directorate also develops and articulates basic and functional Air Force doctrine, ensuring its proper implementation and understanding, and participates in the development and articulation of Joint doctrine.

From the foregoing rundown of the functions of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, it is clear that a principal feature of DCS/P &O responsibility centers upon the planning process. It is through this medium and through frequent interactions with the Joint Staff, the unified and specified commands, and the air components of the unified and specified commands that current Air Force thinking relevant to doctrine and concepts is interjected into the decision/action process. In the course of the planning process, choices must be made and strategies developed which, while perhaps not optimal for any one projected environment, will endow future Air Forces with sufficient flexibility to counter a broad range of possible opponents. Accordingly, a controlling imperative in the planning process is the requirement for flexibility. While the Air Force must be tenacious in pursuit of necessary capabilities, it must also be prepared to revise its goals as changes in the threat develop. Military capabilities must be shaped long before the nature of future conflict environments is made clear. Notwithstanding the constraints and uncertainties inherent in our assumptions about future environments, planning must place high premium upon strategies and force postures that are flexible and adequately suited to a wide variety of military roles. Planning for a single or worst-case conflict scenario will inevitably constrain our ability to deal with the broad spectrum of lesser-intensity actions and compromise our responsiveness to the National Command Authorities.

Obviously, the plans and operations community must plan in concert with the research and development community, each exploiting its special expertise to move the whole towards goals mutually formulated and agreed upon. The crucial concerns of trying to provide strategic guidance for technological development can best be summarized as time span, scarce resources, and changing threat: time span in that technology and weapon systems take years to develop; scarce resources in that all possible or even all desirable weapon systems cannot be afforded; and changing threat in that weapon systems available today may not be those really wanted today and weapons wanted for tomorrow may not be those that are really required tomorrow.

The crux of the problem is that many fields of technology are growing increasingly complex and expensive but must be supported in some rational manner that will hold open the option to develop or modify promising weapon systems as the need arises. The unpredictable quality of crisis situations does not allow for the normal lead time in research and development. Crisis situations require effective forces-in-being. Therefore, politico-military planning must include continuous and sophisticated attention to R&D. Deficiencies in this area can seriously undermine our ability to deal with possible crises. Here, the purposeful influence of strategy can be valuable to lend central direction and consistency to the commitment of technological resources.

While needed Air Force capabilities should evolve from the direction provided by our strategic goals, this in turn depends on an objective assessment of the total environment within which we seek to attain those goals: the external one which deals with the threat and the internal one which deals with the constraints on the size and scope of our military forces. Thus, technological dynamism has provided us with an unprecedented capability for strategic deterrence. But the same weapon capabilities in the hands of a potential aggressor have exposed us and our allies to unprecedented new threats. Similarly, the proliferation of nuclear weapons to several nations now requires U.S. policy-makers to deal with a multitude of potential new policy and systems interactions. With respect to the internal domestic environment, Air Force planners must obviously be concerned with the matter of what strategy the national leadership would elect to follow to achieve its objectives, including its view of the overall utility of armed strength in the pursuit of such objectives.

Clearly, the planning function is not a linear or static phenomenon. Rather, it is a highly interactive and iterative process requiring inputs of political, economic, military, technological, and social considerations and demanding a high order of intellectual expertise and military judgment.

In closing, I would like to borrow from Marshal Ferdinand Foch:

The stroke of genius that turns the fate of battle? I don’t believe in it. A battle is a complicated operation, that you prepare laboriously. If the enemy does this, you say to yourself I will do that. If such and such happens, these are the steps I shall take to meet it. You think out every possible development and decide on the way to deal with the situation created. One of these developments occurs; you put your plan in operation, and everyone says, “What genius . . . ,” whereas the credit is really due to the labor of preparation.

Herein lies the central feature of the responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, and his contribution to the operational forces of the United States Air Force.