Army May Equip Fewer Heavy Combat Teams

[mgstrow]

InsideDefense.com NewsStand | Jen DiMascio | December 29, 2005
In executing a strategy to sustain and modernize its fleet of Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, the Army may fully equip only 33 of 35 heavy modular brigade combat teams, according to a service official.
The strategy is part of a larger plan from the Army's office of programs (G-8) that applies to the fielding of equipment under the modularity effort, the service initiative to transform from a division-based force to one that is brigade-based.
Through modularity, the service would create 35 HBCTs. But the Army may fully equip only 33 of those brigades, Col. Larry Hollingsworth, the project manager for heavy brigade combat teams, told Inside the Army in a Dec. 22 interview.
The rationale for that strategy lies with the Army's Force Generation model, designed to improve active and reserve force deployment schedules. Under ARFORGEN, not every unit will be deployed or in training at the same time; accordingly, not every brigade will need all of the equipment at the same time, he said.
“What we think we may be able to do is field 33 sets of equipment and possibly pool them or rotate them so units can possibly share them. Then, when they get into their ready position, based on ARFORGEN, then the unit gets the best available equipment to train on and then they go into combat with it,” Hollingsworth said, stressing that the plan increases the Army's combat power.
“Not every one of those [units] are going to deploy at the same time, so is it really necessary to have every one of those units equipped? That's extremely expensive, not only to execute but to sustain,” he said.
Of those 35 heavy brigade combat teams, 18 are planned to reside in the active force, and 17 would be in the Reserve force, according to an industry official.
Current plans call for those units to be equipped according to a Fleet Management Strategy first crafted in June and undergoing continual revision, Hollingsworth said.
The strategy includes three key elements -- modularity, which is governed by the Army Campaign Plan; sustainment; and modernization, he said.
The service will use money allotted for modularity to fund the purchase of about 1,260 of the most digitally capable Abrams tanks -- the M1A2 System Enhancement Package -- along with about 2,520 of the digitized Bradley Fighting Vehicle -- the M2A3, Hollingsworth said.
That money will come from a number of different sources, including supplemental spending bills and funds promised in a December 2004 Pentagon program budget decision that directed the Army to receive $5 billion annually between fiscal year 2007 and 2011 for modularity, he said. It also includes money from a recently issued PBD, number 701, which cut programs across the board and added $4.1 billion for modularity in FY-09, FY-10 and FY-11 ( ITA , Dec. 11, p1).
While Hollingsworth declined to cite a specific amount allotted to the purchase, sustainment and upgrade of heavy combat vehicles, he said that modularity is “fully funded” -- and that his program was in line for a large portion of the dollars because heavy brigade combat teams make up 35 out of the total 77 brigade combat teams planned under the modularity initiative.
That money will help sustain the service's heavy fleet, Hollingsworth said.
Plans for sustainment include long-term recapitalization and short-term reset to ensure that the average age of the Army's tanks and Bradleys is 10 years.
For at least the next few years, the vehicles are not likely to undergo what is called recapitalization, a process by which vehicles are restored to like-new condition, Hollingsworth said. Instead, to reduce the age of the fleet, the Army is producing like-new tanks and Bradleys, he said.
In addition, the Army is sending every Bradley and Abrams used in combat back through a “national level” reset program that will add life to the vehicles used heavily in harsh conditions, he said.
Meanwhile, the Army is working to modernize older-model tanks and Bradleys.
The Army sustains three varieties of both heavy combat vehicles. In addition to the M1A2 SEP, the service also maintains the M1A1, the oldest of the currently fielded Abrams tanks, Hollingsworth said. The Army later fielded an upgrade called the M1A1 Integrated Management Program tank.
Bradleys also have been gradually upgraded over the years, culminating in the M2A3. First, there was the M2A2, which was improved upon following Operation Desert Storm, leading to a fleet of M2A2 ODS vehicles.
The Army's goal is to “be pure-fleeted,” meaning it would only have two variants of the tank and the Bradley, he said. To reach its goal, the service will eventually shed its inventory of M1A1 Abrams tanks and M2A2 Bradleys.
On Dec. 15, the service renamed the combat systems program management office as the project office for heavy brigade combat teams, which manages Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, M109A6 Paladin howitzers and M113 Armored Personnel Carriers throughout their life cycles, Hollingsworth said. It resides in Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command under the program executive office for ground combat systems. The office was renamed to better complement the PEO, which includes the PM for Stryker brigade combat teams.
The name change helps commanders in the field know who to contact with problems or questions. “There's a real goodness in the name-brand recognition,” Hollingsworth said.

[herbstin]

Ah, the good idea fairy is alive & well. This partial equipping plan sounds like it was drafted by people who have never had to draw or turn in pre-positioned equipment.

It looks good on Power Point, it makes the bean counters & anti-war weenies happy (less money spent, less killing machines), and makes the Army look pro-active.

Anyone who has ever been through an equipment draw/turn-in can tell you that pre-po equipment has huge problems:

-The equipment has maintenance problems. There are faults that are overlooked/hidden/ignored/occur from idleness. Units drawing the gear are often forced by higher command to accept defective machines in order to meet unrealistic timetables so as not to make the command look bad. It happened to my unit during Desert Shield, drawing POMCUS stock brought from Germany to replace our old, worn out tanks (this is equipment pre-positioned in Europe for units brought in to fight a war with the Soviets - half of it was brand new, the rest escaped from a junk yard). It happens every NTC rotation to those who draw gear there. Units turning in gear go to extreme lenghts to hide every possible defect. They are under a timetable/short on funds for parts/short on personell/tired of fooling with it and want to go home. You'd be amazed at what rubber cement & paint can fix!!!!

-Crews are not intimately familiar with their vehicles. Every machine has at least 1 quirk. Some have many. Crews who fight the tanks they train on & work on everyday should know those vehicles inside-out. It can take several days to weeks for a crew to learn the ins & outs of a strange vehicle.

-Crews have no sense of "ownership" (for lack of a better term) with their vehicle. "It's a rental - treat it like one." Crews who have their own vehicles have a fierce sense of pride in that vehicle. It IS part of the crew, & anything that happens to it affects the crew. A pre-po is just something you ride into battle. That "connection" with it takes a long time to develope.

-What are the troops in the units that don't have equipment going to be doing? Painting rocks? Everyone else's work? The Army absolutely hates the idea of anyone not doing something during the duty day. Units without equipment WILL be parcelled out for every detail that comes by. I shudder to think what the morale of those units will be after a few months.

This is all just another example of our military having way too many staff weenies. Which reminds me, the Army is also reducing the number of combat systems in units. Tank platoons are going from 4 tanks to 3. Tank companies from 14 to 10. (I'm not sure about Mech Inf). You can have all the whiz-bang electronic control systems in the world, but a fighting machine can only control the area in range of its weapons. Less weapons systems, less area controlled.

[MR Nasty]

Herb, When an compitent enemy with heavy armor comes along then they will want heavy units again. Stryker fills that intermediate gap between heavy and light but nothing says national will like a tank. Time will tell. I don't wonder where all this comes from. It goes right along with moving the Armor center to Ft Benning and creating combined arms center or something. Will we be things of the past?