history of US ARmy Light Infantry.

[Manchu34]

Anyone interested in the history about how, why, etc the Light Infantry division and lower commands were developed, MTOE, etc?

I have a lot of material and personal knowledge on this topic. I served with the 7th Infantry Division Light from its concept through its deactivation.

[sabadgeman]

Yeah I would be. I'm always interested in Mil history

[Manchu34]

I'll start working on them. Not sure if I should place here, Military history, etc.

[Manchu34]

I just uploaded 3 pdf files on this topic. The originals are in powerpoint.

1. Is a scanned document written by General John Wickham jr, US Army, chief of staff. it is the White paper addressing the need for the US Army creating the Infantry Division Light and assigning the task to create the doctrine, etc to the 7th US Infantry Division.

2. Is a brief introduction on how the 7th US Infantry Division (light) created policies and procedures to accomplish the assigned mission.

3. A table of Organization of the 7th US Infantry Division (light) and the MTOE for a Infantry Battalion (Light)

[Norfolk]

I rather enjoyed parts of this one, CSI Research Survey No. 6, A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry, by Scott R. McMichael, and its companion piece also by McMichael, CSI Report No. 8, Discussions on Training and Employing Light Infantry.


That said, I tend to agree with this gentleman about the Light Infantry Division concept: The Infantry Division (Light): Did We Read the History Book?, by Gerald E. Thompson. I stumbled across GEN Wickham's old piece a little while back. The Bayonet Division did good work in Panama, but I rather suspect that it would have been very hard-pressed to handle something along the lines of a Korea scenario without being reinforced to something along the lines of the old Regular Infantry Divisions.

[Manchu34]

Originally Posted by Norfolk

I rather enjoyed parts of this one, CSI Research Survey No. 6, A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry, by Scott R. McMichael, and its companion piece also by McMichael, CSI Report No. 8, Discussions on Training and Employing Light Infantry.


That said, I tend to agree with this gentleman about the Light Infantry Division concept: The Infantry Division (Light): Did We Read the History Book?, by Gerald E. Thompson. I stumbled across GEN Wickham's old piece a little while back. The Bayonet Division did good work in Panama, but I rather suspect that it would have been very hard-pressed to handle something along the lines of a Korea scenario without being reinforced to something along the lines of the old Regular Infantry Divisions.

Haven't read those papers, but will check them out, before I will make any comments on them. Yes, we did do a good job in Panama. An yes, we would have been hard pressed to handle a major scenario in Korea. The main reason is the 7th Inf Div (L)'s mission was to be able to fight for 72 hours without resupply or external support in a low to mid intensity conflict. With that in mind, most scenario in Korea would be a high intensity conflict.

Though NTC is not real combat its been considered the closest you can get to combat. With that in mind, I was an OC (~86) in the Starwar building during one of the first Heavy-Light rotations. Though, the brigade lost the force on force missions, the 7IDL unit more then once accomplished their mission more then once. In some cases hours ahead of schedule. Be it assaulting the CRPs, forcing them to withdraw and breached the obstacles approx. 3 hours early.

[Manchu34]

I've read the "The Infantry Division (Light): Did We Read the History Book?", by Gerald E. Thompson. while he did bring up some valid points in his essay, there was some flaws in it as well.

For starters, he uses test units back in the WW2, were logistics was mainly mules, horses, and by foot to prove that a Light Infantry division can't work. He also, just skims over the fact that the majority of the high level in the US Army leaders were opposed to creating a special unit. This fact alone is a setup for failure. Instead of fulling giving their support to the program, they dragged their feet.

Later on in his essay, when he starts talking about the current (1980s) version of the Light Infantry Division, he falls into the same trap of the 1940s. There's no need for a specialized infantry division within the US Army. he talks about the logistical problems, lack of firepower, how they won't be able to fight in a high intensity war.

Yes, there is a logistical problem, because the LIDs were designed primarily to fight in a low to mid intensity conflict. This was mainly due to the fact that the LIDs were geared to have a higher ratio of combat forces to support. Unlike a normal straight leg, airborne or mechanized infantry divisions. he goes on to talked about were a LID's units could only support themselves for only 48 hours before they need to seek support from higher echelons. He forgets, that the other infantry division's units can only support themselves for a little bit longer 72 to 96 hours.

In the part where he talks of the lack of firepower, such as artillery and no laser designators. His claim that because a LID lacks 155mm artillery they can't fight in places such as Europe. While he is correct on the point of fighting in Europe, he ignores the fact that the LID's mission wasn't for Europe. Furthermore, their primary area of operations would not require a 155mm artillery as a primary source of FA. Now as far as his claim of no laser designators with a LID, the LID's did have them.

He talks about the low numbers of the M220 TOW systems within the LIDS. Well, based on the LID's mission an Armour threat was little to none. As far as the lack of ADA support within the LID, he forgot or didn't know that in each LID Infantry Bn had 27 trained and certified Stinger teams permanatly assigned.

He also, goes on to say that because they would be unable to successfully fight in Europe, he ignores reasons to have one. For example, a mech infantry division would have a heck of a time fighting in locations such as Panama, extreme mountainous areas. To make a better point, his reasoning was the same that was applied to the airborne divisions when they were created.

I think I did make my point, I can list a lot more examples and reasons why a LID was successful in their mission.

In conclusion, his main argument is based on the mentality of that time frame, where most Army Leaders felt the next war would be in Europe and any change to the structure of divisions were wrong. Furthermore, what I find amazing, is if the LIDS was a failure from the start, then why did Brigadier General's fight to get the assignment to be the Division Commander of a LID?

Last, but not least, at the time that LTC Thompson, wrote his essay, the LID concept was still in the testing phase. The first LID wasn't even certified yet. The FMs that are still being used today, were still in the works. The true success would not be witnessed until after his paper was published and Operation Just Cause.