South African Armour in Angola

[sabadgeman]

Hi All

In case any one is interested......

From the Army talk site a SA Military chat group

Following a query on SA Armour in th closing stages of the conventional war the following was posted:-


During Ops Modular 11 tanks (1 squadron were used) and were operated by School of Armour's E Squadron

During Ops Hooper two tank squadrons (22 tanks) were used. F Squadron was from School of Armour and A Squadron from Pretoria Regiment . Pretoria Regiment was relieved halfway through the Ops by Regiment Molopo.

During Ops Packer two tank squadrons (22) were used and were operated by Regiment President Steyn.

With the Cuban advance in June 1988 one squadron was used operated by 61 Mechanised Battalion Group.

In all cases the Olifant MBT was used

Cheers

Steve

[sfga6970]

That is interesting. I would like to read more about it. Any links?

[vulcanxm603]

Originally Posted by sabadgeman

Hi All

In case any one is interested......

From the Army talk site a SA Military chat group

Following a query on SA Armour in th closing stages of the conventional war the following was posted:-


During Ops Modular 11 tanks (1 squadron were used) and were operated by School of Armour's E Squadron

During Ops Hooper two tank squadrons (22 tanks) were used. F Squadron was from School of Armour and A Squadron from Pretoria Regiment . Pretoria Regiment was relieved halfway through the Ops by Regiment Molopo.

During Ops Packer two tank squadrons (22) were used and were operated by Regiment President Steyn.

With the Cuban advance in June 1988 one squadron was used operated by 61 Mechanised Battalion Group.

In all cases the Olifant MBT was used

Cheers

Steve

I have read the same information in several of my books on the SADF and the Angola war. The best book I have found on this conflict is: SOUTH AFRICA'S BORDER WAR 1966 - 1989 by Willem Steenkamp.

[vulcanxm603]

Originally Posted by sfga6970

That is interesting. I would like to read more about it. Any links?

There are several books out on the South African involvement in Angola.

Here are some links to sites on the SADF at this period of time:

SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE SCRAP BOOK

SENTINEL PROJECTS "BAD GUYS": TABLE OF CONTENTS - PERSONAL ACCOUNTS OF SERVICE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE (SADF)

Also bear in mind that South Africa only moved its tanks up to Angola in the later part of its involement there. According to some sources these tanks were involed in the largest tank battle since WW2.

some pics attached of the SA Armour (Olifants tank) in Angola.

[sabadgeman]

There is a lot of disinformation around there were less than 30 tanks involved at any one time and two only were lost. At the moment the ANC government is trying to rewrite history and make out 100's of tanks were used by both Cubans and SA ala Alemein and that 100's of tanks and 1,000's of personnel were killed.

South Africa is going through huge amounts of internal problems with electricity shortages black outs economic problems and this is a way of deflecting the masses away from reality.

There is a huge debate raging on the Army talk site at the moment most of it unfortunately in Afrikaans but here is an English newspaper article but I have no link for it. Recces are the SA equivalent of the SAS or US SEALS.

January 19, 2008
The Saturday Star newspaper (Johannesburg)

Truth is always the first casualty
by Brendan Seery (served as bureau chief of Argus Africa News Service
in Windhoek, Namibia, from 1985 to 1990)

A year before, most of them hadn't even started shaving. A year
before, Saturdays were for fun. Back home, 2 000km away as the C130
transport aircraft flew, some of their lucky mates - those who managed
to duck the call-up or who got deferments of their two-year national
service so that they could go to varsity - continued to enjoy the good
life of white South Africa.

Now, in a hot, dusty, blood-spattered hell, their Saturdays had long
since ceased to be about anything but survival; not being killed or
ending up spending the rest of their days in wheelchairs.

Twenty years later, South African veterans of the battles of the Lomba
River and Cuito Cuanavale still don't talk, outside of their own
circles, about their involvement in the fiercest fighting on the
African continent since the massed armour battles at El Alamein in World War 2.

That's why many of them reacted with outrage this week after the ANC's
national working committee announced that it planned to join Angolans,
Namibians, Cubans and Russians in celebrating the "defeat of the
racist forces" at Cuito Cuanavale.

The biggest difficulty in trying to decide what actually happened at
the battles which were fought in Angola in 1987 and 1988 - and the
fighting involved more than just the provincial outpost town of Cuito
Cuanavale - is that there is so much emotional dust and so much
propaganda, from all sides.

The ANC - which had a small number of uMkhonto weSizwe cadres as
observers attached to Angolan brigades involved in the battles, along
with its allies, claims Cuito Cuanavale was a victory because the SADF
was repulsed and forced to retreat.

The victory at the town, their version goes, paved the way for
Namibian independence, and later South Africa's own historic
liberation, because it showed the white regime that it could be
defeated by freedom fighters.

In 1991, Nelson Mandela said: "The defeat of the apartheid army was an
inspiration to the struggling people in South Africa. Without the
defeat of Cuito Cuanavale, our organisations would not have been
unbanned. The defeat of the racist army at Cuito Cuanavale has made it
possible for me to be here today. Cuito Cuanavale was a milestone in
the history of the struggle for Southern African liberation."

Chester Crocker, the former US assistant secretary of state for
African affairs during the Reagan administration, took a different
view in his book High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough
Neighborhood: that the battles were a Cold War victory for the West
over the Soviet Union and its allies and surrogates.

In his version, which dovetails with the former SADF's, the ultimate
goal of the Soviets was to overthrow Namibia and South Africa and gain
access not only to the valuable Cape sea route, but the strategic
metals and minerals of South Africa.

Crocker and a number of South African and American historians argue
that the defeat of the Soviets and their allies, coupled with the
difficulties the Soviets were suffering in Afghanistan in trying to
eradicate the Mujahideen, helped precipitate the collapse of the
communist Eastern bloc - and the end of the Cold War - less than two
years later.

The Angolan/Cuban/Soviet massed brigades formed up in mid-1987 to
finally rout South Africa's Angolan ally, Jonas Savimbi, and his Unita
organisation from the south-eastern part of Angola around Mavinga and Jamba.

There is no doubt strategically that if they had succeeded, the South
Africans would have been forced to double the length of border in
Namibia they were defending, alone. This would have been militarily
impossible and would have led, probably, to the collapse of Namibia.
Had that occurred, then the South African politicians might well have
felt themselves cornered and might have resorted to deploying the
nuclear weapons they had. That in turn might have led to an even
larger conflagration.

So there were large stakes indeed at play in south-eastern Angola in 1987.

It is not disputed by most historians - even those sympathetic to
Angola and Cuba - that in the first battles of the campaign, on the
Lomba River, the combined Soviet-backed forces suffered a terrible
mauling. Advancing out of Cuito Cuanavale, they were led into a
well-prepared series of ambush battles by the South Africans, who had
chosen the Lomba River valley as their "killing ground".

Using Olifant tanks, supported by G5 155mm artillery and the South
African version of the Russian 122mm "Stalin Organ"multiple rocket
launcher, the South Africans sowed chaos among the ranks of the
advancing columns.

There were about 4 500 SADF soldiers (the bulk of them national
servicemen, as well as 1 500 black soldiers in various units) ranged
against 12 brigades of mixed Soviet/Cuban/Angolan (Fapla) troops,
tanks, mechanised infantry, and artillery. Later, around 4 000 Unita
troops joined in the ground battles alongside the South Africans.

Few people know the extent of foreign support for the South Africans.
The Americans supplied CIA advisers and Stinger anti-aircraft
missiles; there was a French military contingent deployed with
anti-tank rockets ; as well as small contingents from Zaire, Uganda
and even Morocco.

However, because of the air superiority of the attacking forces - with
fearsome MiG fighters and Mi-24 helicopter gunships - the South
Africans and their allies didn't have everything their own way. Also,
sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons (including the SAM-8 missile used
for the first time outside Russia) saw the South Africans losing, or
having damaged, a number of aircraft, which could not be replaced
because of the arms embargo.

Yet, in the bloody battles which raged across the Lomba floodplain,
the Angolan/Cuban Russian brigades lost upwards of 4 000 killed and an
estimated $ 1-billion in armaments.

The attacking forces withdrew to Cuito Cuanavale and set up a heavily
defended perimeter.

They were pursued by the SADF, which now deployed Citizen Force
part-time soldiers to replace the exhausted national servicemen who
had fought themselves to a standstill at the Lomba River. The fact
that the SADF command could deploy the part-timers showed that the
generals believed the threat to Unita was over.

The South Africans were halted as they moved towards Cuito Cuanavale
at the Tumpo River, 22km east of the town, by Angolan and Cuban troops
dug into strong positions surrounded by minefields.
Click here!

Stalled, the SADF then employed what it termed a holding operation,
aimed at preventing any further forays towards Mavinga and Jamba. To
that end, they turned Cuito Cuanavale into rubble, with shelling and
rocket fire. The airstrip runway was shredded in the process.

So, it is correct that Cuito Cuanavale was never captured. The SADF
maintained it never intended to capture the town. That campaign
effectively ended in a stalemate.

That much was acknowledged by a Soviet analyst M Ponoromov, who wrote
in the Krasnaya Zvezda magazine on May 20 1988: "The People's Armed
Forces for the Liberation of Angola have not been able either, even
with the help of the Cubans, to decisively defeat the enemy and drive
him out of the territory or the country. The result, frankly speaking,
was an impasse."

Yet, Cuito Cuanavale was a defeat for the South Africans on the
broader political, diplomatic and strategic level - and on the
propaganda level.

Both sides were forced to accept that hostilities in Angola would
produce no clear winner and that the body count, and materiel cost,
would be huge.

Sending home hundreds of white boys in body bags would, former SADF
chief Jannie Geldenhuys told Beeld this week, have resulted in the
collapse of PW Botha's government. Equally, the Soviets and Cubans
could not afford the massive costs of the war in monetary terms. So,
peace talks were given the impetus they needed.

Agreement was reached on Namibian independence and a withdrawal from
Angola of both the South Africans and the Cubans. Namibia's
independence led directly to the release of Nelson Mandela, the
unbanning of the ANC and PAC and the start of the negotiation process
in South Africa. So, it is also correct that the battles of 1987/88,
whoever is regarded as the winner, were the start of a domino effect
which led to the end of apartheid.

Piero Gleijeses, professor of US foreign policy at Johns Hopkins
University in Washington, wrote in the Mail & Guardian last year that,
having reviewed both American and Cuban documentation, he was
confident the South Africans did intend to capture Cuito Cuanavale,
having cornered Angola and Cuban units outside the town. This provoked
Cuban leader Fidel Castro into committing huge numbers of reinforcements.

These reinforcements, wrote Gleijeses, included Castro's "best planes
with his best pilots, his most sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons and
his most modern tanks. Castro's goal was not merely to defend Cuito,
it was to force the SADF out of Angola once and for all. Castro later
described this strategy to SA Communist Party leader Joe Slovo: Cuba
would halt the South African onslaught and then attack from another
direction, 'like a boxer who with his left hand blocks the blow and,
with his right, strikes'".

According to the historian, the Cubans helped the Angolans hold Cuito
Cuanavale, but at the same time launched another column towards the
Namibian border through south-western Angola.

Despite propaganda to the contrary disseminated by the SADF in
newspapers in South Africa which dismissed the threat of the column,
Gleijeses said the South African hierarchy took the advancing column
very seriously. However, former SADF sources have commented that the
column did not even carry with it so-called "first-line logistics" -
the materiel needed to resupply troops in the field if they engage in
combat. These sources maintain that this clearly shows that the
column's purpose was limited solely to a show of force, intended to
try to obtain leverage at the peace negotiations.

At the end of June 1988, Cuban MiG fighters attacked South African
positions at Calueque Dam just inside Angola. In one of these a South
African Buffel armoured vehicle was hit by a rocket, killing all 12
white national servicemen it was carrying.

The South Africans immediately claimed that the strike had been a
mistake by the MiG pilot, who, they claimed, was trying to bomb the
dam itself. That excuse, accepted by the South African media, does not
stand up to scrutiny because a MiG's normal armament - and
particularly a rocket - would not destroy a dam.

The combined effects of the stalemate at Cuito Cuanavale and the
prospects of more bloodshed (as evidenced by the Buffel attack)
further stimulated the moves towards a settlement.

Yet, on the Cuban side, too, there was a pressing need to settle: the
war had cost more than Castro and his advisers had reckoned on in both
human and financial terms. (Interestingly, a senior Cuban general who
was in charge of the operations in 1987/88 was summoned home and
executed by firing squad, allegedly for "smuggling".)

Gleijeses concluded that "Cuba changed the course of Southern African history".

"The Cubans' battlefield prowess and negotiating skills were
instrumental in forcing South Africa to accept Namibia's independence.
Their successful defence of Cuito was the prelude for a campaign that
forced the SADF out of Angola. This victory reverberated beyond Namibia."

The truth of Cuito Cuanavale is always going to be elusive, but even
more so now that those who beat apartheid can edit the history books.

It is even more difficult because many of the documents from SADF and
South African government archives relating to those campaigns were
either shredded before 1994 or since (as happened in the case of
detailed operational logbooks from the operations which were part of
the SADF's documentation).

For the embittered SADF veterans who have been writing to newspapers
to decry the ANC's celebration plans, there will never be the
opportunity to commemorate their own efforts - efforts which on a
winning side and in another war would have been hailed as "heroic".

In any war, the first casualty is the truth.
---------
Cuanavale bridge holds the key to who wanted to capture the town

A telling argument in support of the SADF's assertion that it never
wanted to capture Cuito Cuanavale is that, early on in the campaign, a
small Special Forces (Recce) unit blew up the only bridge over the
Cuanavale River. If the SADF had intended to capture the town, why did
it destroy the only access?

Few people outside Recce circles or those interested in military
history know that the demolition of the bridge was one of the most
amazing in the elite unit's annals.

Wearing special wetsuits and swimming under water, the Recces
approached the bridge, which was guarded by an infantry unit, four
tanks, barbed wire and underwater explosives.

One of these booby traps detonated and the South Africans were fired
on heavily. Despite this, and the fact that two Recces were attacked
by crocodiles, the team destroyed most of the bridge.

Afterwards, the bridge could only be used by personnel and not
vehicles, hampering the transfer of reinforcements from Cuito
Cuanavale to the front. - Brendan Seery

[vulcanxm603]

SA Tank losses in Angola.

Op Modular - E Squadron school of armour. Modular was also the first tank vs tank battle involving SA forces since WW2.
Squadron commanded by Andre Retief (original commander was Jimmy Stadtler but it was felt Andre had more experience so he took the squadron up)
I think 1 Olifant was hit by a mine but recovered almost immediately, other than that no losses

Op Hooper - F Squadron and Pretoria Regiment squadron and taking over from PR a squadron of Regiment Molopo.
no losses but apprroximaitley 5 tanks hit mines

Op Packer - 2 tank squadrons from the Regiment President Steyn with headquarters elements drawn from Regt de la Rey (these formed a light regiment). 2 citizen force squadrons under a school of armour commander
3 tanks lost to mines.

Operations Modular and Hooper cost the SADF and SWATF 31 killed (from a total of 43 from both Angola and the operational area combined) and 90 wounded with 2 Mirages and a Bosbok light aircraft shot down, three Olifant tanks destroyed or damaged and captured, 4 Ratel IFV’s destroyed and other various vehicles damaged.
The third battle of Tumpo took place on the 23rd March 1988, and it was was at this time that 3 Olifant tanks were disabled in a minefield. These tanks were salvaged by the Angolans before the South Africans had time to destroy the tanks completely. As a result of this loss the South African attack on Tumpo was aborted.

'Sourced from various places'

[Vorster]

Hi guys I am doing research for a book which is planned for release latter in the year. It will be a coffe table type book with a short write up (well not realy) of each battle and hundreds of previously unpublished photos. I have started to post rough drafts of the chapters here:

South Africas last operations into Angola - Military Photos

At most we had about 26 Tanks in Angola during the latter stages of Op. Hooper. Despite this small number we managed to destroy 94 Tanks for the loss of 3.

We also had a number of mad firsts. Ratel 90s taking on T55s while driving round and round the tank. A Ratel 20 taking down a T55 with it's 20 mm gun (happened twice although both crews were killed shortly afterwards).

As far as armor warfare goes this was then one place on earth were no self respecting military man would have employed tanks. In most of the battles the engagement distance was less tha 15m and in some cases the bush was so dense that the tanks couldn't traverse their guns. In spite of it all we did not loose one tank in a tank on tank engagement. The three tanks were abandoned in a dense minefield under heavy fire when they were immobilised by mines.

I am more than willing to share any info I have with you guys.