French judge: ATMs help finance militants

[Woodmonkey]

French judge: ATMs help finance militants

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Radical Islamic cells in Europe are using an ingenious way to finance terror networks that's virtually impossible to trace: withdrawing hundreds of thousands of dollars a month from cash machines with fake credit cards, according to France's top anti-terrorism judge. Jean-Louis Bruguiere, who's been at the forefront of the war on terror for 20 years, also told The Associated Press the Caucasus has replaced Afghanistan as a key militant training ground for Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida network and other groups around the world. Full Story

TRC Analysis:
It is difficult and sometimes counter-productive to search for the center of gravity of a terrorist network or an insurgency. However, if one were to identify the likely center of gravity for any terrorist group, it would probably be funding. Whilst most terrorist movements can operate on a relatively modest budget, funding is still essential to support all activities, including recruitment and training, procurement, infrastructure, personnel expenses, operations, a political campaign, and social/community activities. Securing adequate funding is, therefore, a critical activity for any terrorist group.

Given the considerable efforts of authorities to interdict terrorist funding, a great deal more money is required than is actually needed to sustain a group or network. Losses can be as high as 80% of the total ‘collected’. Therefore, by successfully interdicting terrorist finances, it is not only possible to reduce the capacity, activity, and effectiveness of a network, it is also possible to undermine the morale and commitment of some of its members. Indeed, such a campaign can force a terrorist group to spend more time and energy trying to sustain itself than it does conducting operations.

Terrorist groups obtain funding from many sources. Traditionally, money that is given willingly by a network of supporters is the most valuable and reliable source of ‘income’. Such ‘charitable donations’ are difficult to interdict and only a concerted long-term ‘hearts and minds’ campaign is likely to dissuade supporters from making such ‘contributions’. However, even for groups like the Provisional IRA (Group Profile) and ETA (Group Profile), both of which enjoy easy access to a sizable support base, this ‘pot’ is insufficient for their needs. Most groups and particularly small independent cells that operate outside of a supportive community, therefore, resort to criminal activity to supplement their income. Such activities can include:

Extortion (“Taxes”) -- from own and wider community

Organized Criminal Activities -- Fraud, theft, prostitution, drugs, money laundering, protection rackets

Consultancy -- Selling skills/technology to other groups

Money lending (with many strings)

More mature terrorist groups have also branched out into legitimate business activities in order to secure ‘clean’ funds, and larger groups usually establish dedicated cells whose primary task is funding. Many terrorist operatives also supplement their income by taking a legitimate job or by working in the black economy.

The latest revelation by one of France’s top anti-terrorism judges--that Islamic extremists are funding their activities through ATM fraud—should, therefore, come as no surprise. There is often a local nexus between terrorist and criminal activity, and the typical terrorist is usually quick to exploit new vulnerabilities. Various types of electronic, credit card, and cyber fraud are particularly attractive to criminals and terrorists alike, not only because of the substantial amounts involved but also because these activities are more difficult to detect than most other types of criminal activity. Given the relatively modest budgets of small cells and sub-networks, scams can provide the bulk of the funding need to operate effectively and are, therefore, particularly attractive to Islamic terrorist groups operating in Western Europe. It is, therefore, critical that every effort is made to protect against such criminal activities, as the net effect may include not only direct financial losses but also significant loss of life and indirect losses resulting from both physical and psychological damage. It is also vital that law enforcement agencies are fully aware of the potential for criminal activity to be linked to terrorism and investigate crimes accordingly. Indeed, it is probably more likely that a terrorist group will be detected whilst engaged in a crime than an actual operation.

It also comes as no surprise that Judge Bruguieres believes that the Caucasus region has become a focus for al-Qaeda- (Group Profile) inspired terrorist activity. Areas such as Chechnya, Ossetia, and Ingushetia are highly unstable and have indigenous Muslim populations in conflict with the authorities. Such failing states are ideal locations for al-Qaeda to recruit, train, and hide. The situation throughout the Caucasus is further complicated by the direct involvement of Russia (Country Profile). This limits our ability to interdict al-Qaeda and also drags us into conflicts in which Russia’s actions are part of the problem not the solution. We, therefore, have to strike a very fine balance between encouraging Russia to join the fight against al-Qaeda whilst at the same time avoiding being seen as endorsing their policies and actions, which by any measure have been excessive and sometimes illegal under international law.

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